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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

.
.
.

-vMARY HOLLOWAY,

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 18219

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

The appellant, Mary

v.

Holloway, was charged with

second-degree murder, a first-degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann., § 76-5-203 (1973), as amended, and was tried
before a jury in the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, the Honorable Peter F. Leary presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

The jury found appellant guilty of second-degree
murder, and the trial court sentenced her to an indeterminate
term of not less than five years, and which may be for life,
in the Utah State Prison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Respondent seeks affirmance of appellant's
convict ion.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
on March 13, 1981, following marital disagreements,
the victim, Samuel Beare, temporarily occupied an apartment
which was then in possession of the appellant, Mary Holloway,
and Charles L. Crick (T. 239).

The apartment is located at

269 Kelsey Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah (T. 239).

Prior to

the victim's change in address, the friendship between the
appellant and the victim had deteriorated to such a point that
appellant told a friend that she and Charles Crick hated the
victim and intended to kill him (T. 114-116, 124).
During the evening of March 14, 1981, Charles Crick,
the appellant and the victim were in the Kelsey Avenue
apartment drinking alcoholic beverages and watching television
(T. 241).

Later that evening, Charles Crick left to pick up

his laundry and he returned to the apartment at approximately
12:00 midnight, accompanied by Tommy Garcia, an acquaintance
(T. 241).

Shortly thereafter and apparently following a

heated argument, the appellant, Tommy Garcia, and Charles
Crick attacked the victim in the apartment bedroom (T. 242,
243).

Charles Crick choked the victim until he was nearly

unconscious, whereupon the appellant grabbed his head, yanked
it back, and told him to plead for his life (T. 134, 156).
The appellant, along with the others, then hit the victim's
head with glass beer mugs (T. 156).

Charles Crick continued

the vicious, cowardly attack on the helpless vi.ctim by hitting
-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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him in the head with a bar of teak wood (T. 156).

Following

the beating, a knife was produced, and the appellant, Charles
Crick and Tommy Garcia each took turns stabbing the victim,
inflicting fifteen separate wounds, each wound seven to eight
inches deep (T. 157, 196, 199).
The victim died at about 2:00 a.m. on March 15, 1981
(T. 199, 158, 3).
Following the murder, the victim's body was placed
in the back seat of a car1 and, with Charles Crick at the
wheel and the appellant and Tommy Garcia as passengers, the
body was transported to 1400 East Sunnyside Avenue where the
car was parked near a street light (T. 3, 158, 261).

Moments

later, Ryan Nielsen, a University of Utah police officer who
had finished his night shift at 2:00 a.m., drove by the car
ain noticed its three occupants standing nearby (T. 2, 3).
Becoming suspicious, Officer Nielsen turned his car around and
drove eastbound along Sunnyside Avenue passing the car and its
occupants again (T. 4).

Following another U-turn, Officer

Nielsen proceeded westbound along Sunnyside Avenue and as he
passed the car a third time he observed Tommy Garcia pulling
the victim's body from the car (T. 4, 5, 245).

Seeking help,

Officer Nielsen drove to a 7-Eleven store located at 800 South
1300 East, informed the clerk of the situation and asked him
to call the police (T. 5).

-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In the meantime, the car containing the murderers
passed the 7-Eleven store heading westbound on 800 South, and
Officer Nielsen followed it (T. 5).

The car containing

appellant malfunctioned and it stopped at 500 East 800 South
(T. 6).

As the appellant and the two other occupants

investigated the problem, Officer Nielsen approached their
car, identified himself, and told them to lie on the ground
(T. 7).

All three complied with his order (T. 7).

Moments

later, however, Tommy Garcia jumped up and ran from Officer
Nielsen (T. 7, 246).

Before pursuing Garcia, he told

appellant and Charles Crick that they were under arrest and
that they were to stay on the ground (T. 8).

Officer Nielsen

then pursued Tommy Garcia, apprehending him minutes later.

In

the meantime, appellant and Charles Crick fled on foot,
returning to their apartment (T. 8, 247).
Following further police investigation, appellant
and Charles Crick were both

~rrest~d

on March 23, 1981 (T.

70).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED
APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR A MANSLAUGHTER
JURY INSTRUCTION.
At the conclusion of trial in a hearing outside the
presence of the jury, appellant requested a manslaughter jury
-4-
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instruction (T. 290).

The trial court rejected the proffered

instruction and appellant took exception (T. 295).
On her appeal, appellant argues that the facts in
the record rationally supported a finding that her conduct
fell within the purview of Utah Code Ann.,

§

76-5-205 (1973),

as amended, as a lesser included offense, and that the trial
court's refusal to issue the

request~d

manslaughter

instruction constituted reversible error.

Alternatively,

appellant argues that she, as a defendant in a criminal case,
had a right to submit her theory to the jury in the form of
instructions, and that the trial court's failure to submit the
requested manslaughter instruction denied her that right.
A.

APPELLANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO AN
INSTRUCTION ON MANSLAUGHTER AS A
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE.

A defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction on
a lesser included offense "unless there is a rational basis
for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged
and convicting him of the included offense."
§ 76-1-402(4) (1973), as amended.

Utah Code Ann.,

Since manslaughter is a

lesser included offense of second-degree murder, see Farrow v.
Smith, Utah, 541 P.2d 1107, 1109

(1975)~

cf. State v. Norman,

Utah, 580 P.2d 237 (1978), the issue in the case at bar
becomes whether or not the facts provided a rational basis
-5-
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for a verdict acquitting the appellant of second-degree murder
and convicting her of manslaughter.
Analysis that would be helpful in resolving this
issue is found in State v. Dougherty, Utah, 550 P.2d 175
(1976).

There, the defendant was charged with unlawful

distribution for value of a controlled substance.

During

trial, an undercover agent testified that an intermediary made
the initial arrangements for the future purchase of narcotics
from the defendant.

Once the arrangements were completed, the

undercover agent, with the intermediary present, purchased the
narcotics from the defendant.

The intermediary, however,

testified that the defendant was not present during the
transaction and that the agent purchased the drugs directly
from the intermediary. At the close of his trial and relying
upon Utah Code Ann., S 77-33-6 (1953), as amended, the
predecessor to S 76-1-402(4), the defendant requested the
trial court issue an instruction on the lesser included
offense of possession of a controlled substance.

The trial

court ref used to issue this instruction and the defendant was
convicted of the greater offense.

Following his conviction,

the defendant appealed, assigning as error the lower court's
refusal to issue the requested jury instruction.
The Dougherty court began its analysis of
appellant's claim by stating that a defendant does not have an
absolute right to instructions on lesser included offenses,
-~
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but that the right only attaches when the evidence and
circumstances justify.

Id. at 1761 and, when addressing this

issue, the Court:
will survey the evidence, and the
inferences which admit of a rational
deduction, to determine if there exists
reasonable basis upon which a conviction
of the lesser included offense could rest.
Id. at 176.

This Court further noted that issues concerning

lesser included offenses arose in three situations:
First, where there is evidence which would
absolve the defendant from guilt of a
greater offense, or degree, but would
support a finding of guilt of a lesser
offense, or degree1 the instruciton is
mandatory.
Second, where the evidence would not
support a finding of guilt in the
commission of the lesser offense or
degree. For example, the defendant denies
any complicity in the crime charged, and
thus lays no foundation for any
intermediate verdict. • • • This second
situation renders an instruction on a
lesser included offense erroneous, because
it is not pertinent.
Third, is an intermediate situation. One
where the elements of the greater offense
include all the elements of the lesser
offense1 because, by its very nature, the
greater offense could not have been
committed without defendant having the
intent in doing the acts, which constitute
the lesser offense. In such a situation
instructions on the lesser included
offense may be given, because all elements
of the lesser offense have been proved.
However, such an instruction ma
ro erl
be re use i t e prosecution has met its
-7-
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burden of proof on the greater offense,
and there is no evidence tending to reduce
the greater offense.
Id. at 176, 177 (Emphasis added).

Affirming defendant's

conviction, this Court held that the defense testimony could
only prove complete innocence, and thus he was not entitled to
an instruction on the lesser included offense because the
evidence in the record shows he could only be found guilty or
not guilty of the offense charged.

Id. at 177.

Although Dougherty dealt with

§

77-33-6, the earlier

included offense statute, the appropriateness of its analysis
under the purview of

§

76-1-402(4), the current lesser

included offense statute, was ratified by this Court in State
v. Chestnut, Utah, 621 P.2d 1228 (1980).
More recently, the issue of a trial court's refusal
to grant a requested jury instruction on a lesser included
offense was addressed by this Court in State v. Elliott, Utah,
641 P.2d 122 (1982).

There, the defendants were charged with
/

the offense of aggravated sexual assault and convicted of the
offense of forcible sodomy.

Following conviction, the

defendants appealed, asserting that the trial court erred when
it refused to issue requested instructions on either assault
or aggravated assault.

Addressing this claim, this Court

concluded that the lesser offenses of assault and aggravated
assault were included within the offense of aggravated sexual
assault.

Furthermore, this Court found that evidence had been
-8-
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adduced at trial which established a rational basis for a
verdict of acquittal on the crime charged and for a conviction
on the offenses of assault or aggravated assault.

Critical to

the establishment of the reational basis and to this court's
subsequent reversal of the conviction was defendant's
testimony "wherein they readily admitted the commission of the
assault, but denied the commission of sodomy or the intent to
commit sodomy."

Id. at 124 n. 14 (emphasis added).

Viewing the record in the instant case, appellant's
attack upon her conviction must fail because there exists no
evidence that would support a finding of guilt for
manslaughter.

The manslaughter statute,

§

76-5-205, requires

that the actor so convicted must have at least caused or
recklessly caused the death of another.

During trial,

however, appellant maintained that Tommy Garcia was solely
responsible for the victim's death and that she merely stood
in the bedroom corner while the vicious attack occurred,
pleading with Charles Crick to i~tercede in the victim's
behalf (T. 244).

Furthermore, she testified that she was

forced to accompany Tommy Garcia as he disposed of the
victim's body (T. 245).

She also stated that when they

arrived at their destination she remained in the car, and that
after Garcia removed the victim he returned covered with blood
and holding a knife (T. 246).

Even during closing argument

appellant maintains her innocence, claiming that there existed
no evidence pointing to her involvement in the murder.
-9-

Thus,
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under the Dougherty rule, the issuance of a manslaughter
instruction at appellant's trial would have been erroneous
because appellant denied any complicity in the victim's murder
and laid no foundation for an intermediate verdict.

See also:

State v. Burrow, 221 Kan. 754, 561 P.2d 864 (1977) (held that
the lower court properly refused appellant's requested
manslaughter instructions because appellant testified that
they had not participated in any unlawful killing).
Furthermore, the instant case also falls within the
third category summarized in Dougherty, supra, because
respondent met its burden of proof for second-degree murder
and there was no evidence tending to reduce the crime to
manslaughter.

Utah Code Ann., S 76-5-203(l)(a) (1973), as

amended, provides that "[c]riminal homicide constitutes murder
in the second degree if the actor:
causes the death of another • • • • "

Intentionally or knowingly
The evidence adduced at

trial overwhelmingly supports appellant's guilty verdict for
second-degree murder.

Prior to the murder, appellant, with

Charles Crick present, told Lillian Archuleta that they hated
the victim and intended to kill him (T. 116).

Furthermore, on

the morning following the murder, with two visitors present,
appellant recounted in detail the events that led to the
victim's death (T. 130, et seq.: 150, et. seq.):
specifically, appellant had grabbed the victim's head and made
-10-
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him plead for his life1 she had struck the victim's head with
a beer mug1 and finally, she had taken turns with the two
other murderers stabbing the victim with a knife, producing
fifteen wounds, each of which was fatal.

The only reasonable

interpretation to this horrendous sequence of events is that
appellant either intentionally or knowingly caused the death
of the victim and was thus guilty of second-degree murder.
In addition, there exist no facts indicating that
appellant could have been convicted of manslaughter.
Appellant argues, however, that the following facts support an
inference that she was reckless and thus entitled to a
manslaughter instruction:

she did ·not participate in the

initial confrontation between Tommy Garcia and the victim; she
had been drinking the. evening the victim died; she had no
blood on her person; and she was only a passenger in the car
that transported the victim's body.

None of these alleged

facts separately or collectively would tend to reduce the
offense from second-degree murder to manslaughter.

Assuming

that appellant's testimony is true, the fact that she did not
participate in the initial argument between Tommy Garcia and
the victim does not change the legal effect of her subsequent
conduct--the fatal stabbing of the victim.

Also, the fact

that no blood was found on appellant's body is insignificant
since the evidence adduced at trial indicates that Tommy
Garcia placed the body in and removed it from the car.
Equally insignificant is the fact that appellant was merely
-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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a passenger in the car carrying the victim's body because this
fact in no way supports an inference that appellant recklessly
caused the victim's death.

Finally, mere consumption of

alcohol before the commission of the crime does not tend to
reduce that crime from second-degree murder to manslaughter.
In State v. Sisneros, Utah, 631 P.2d 856, 859 (1981), this
Court, in construing Utah Code Ann.,

§

76-2-306 (1973), as

amended, the voluntary intoxication statute, adopted as
consistent therewith the following statement:
Under the law, a state of voluntary
intoxication from alcohol is not a defense
to a criminal charge unless such
intoxication is of such degree or state as
to negate the existence of the mental
state which is an element of the offense.
Neither testimony nor any other facts in the record support a
conclusion that appellant was so inebriated that she was
unable to form the requisite intent for second-degree murder.
Appellant's consumption level

w~~

not sufficient to negate the

mental state for second-degree murder and thus this fact does
not tend to reduce the offense to manslaughter.
Therefore, under Dougherty, supra, and

§

76-1-402(4), appellant was not entitled to her requested
manslaughter instruction and thus the trial court did not
commit error in denying her request.

-12-
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B.

APPELLANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A
MANSLAUGHTER INSTRUCTION ON HER THEORY
OF THE CASE.

A defendant is entitled to the issuance of jury
instructions that present his theory of the case.
Torres, Utah, 619 P.2d 694, 695 (1980).

State v.

This entitlement is

not absolute, however, but is predicated upon the existence of
evidence providing a reasonable basis that justifies giving
the requested instructions.
1211, 1213 (1980).

State v. Eagle, Utah, 611 P.2d

Furthermore, a defendant is not entitled

to the presentiment of a new theory through jury instructions
when that theory is wholly inconsistent with the theory the
defendant actually proffered during trial.

See State v.

Stone, Utah, 629 P.2d 442 (1981).
Based upon the foregoing authority, appellant was
not entitled to a manslaughter instruction as her theory of
the case.

The facts as found in the record and summarized in

the Statement of Facts and Point/I-A, supra, clearly indicate
that there does not exist a scintilla of evidence providing a
rational basis that would have justified the issuance of a
manslaughter instruction.

Furthermore, appellant's theory

relied upon during trial was that she din not participate in
the acts that led to the victim's death.

This theory is

wholly inconsistent with a manslaughter theory that at least
requires the defendant to have caused the death of the victim.
-13-
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Therefore, appellant was not entitled under this rubric to a
manslaughter instruction.
CONCLUSION
The record is devoid of evidence justifying
appellant's claim that the trial court erred when it refused
to issue the requested manslaughter instruction.

Therefore,

respondent respectfully requests this Court to affirm
appellant's conviction for second-degree murder.
Respectfully submitted this 29th day of October,
1982 •.
DAVID L. WILKINSON

A~n~l~
ROBERT N. PARRISH
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact
copies of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to Ronald J.
Yengich, Attorney for Appellant, 44 Exchange Place, Salt Lake
City, Utah, 84111, this 29th day of October, 1982.
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